Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for Limited Admissibility—State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987) by Dwyer, Deborah A.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 63 Number 4 
10-1-1988 
Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for 
Limited Admissibility—State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 
12 (1987) 
Deborah A. Dwyer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Deborah A. Dwyer, Note, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for Limited 
Admissibility—State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987), 63 Wash. L. Rev. 1063 (1988). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol63/iss4/26 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME: AN
ARGUMENT FOR LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY-State v. Black,
109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
In State v. Black, 1 the Washington Supreme Court faced the ques-
tion of whether the State, in a rape case, should be allowed to offer
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome ("RTS").2 After examin-
ing some of the relevant scientific literature, case law, and the stan-
dards governing the admissibility of expert testimony, the court held
that expert testimony on RTS was inadmissible. The court based its
decision on findings that RTS testimony lacks scientific reliability, and
that it unfairly prejudices a defendant accused of rape.
The court's holding in Black was based on a misinterpretation of the
available scientific literature, and on the erroneous belief that expert
testimony on RTS is always unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. The
court's standard for determining the reliability of scientific evidence is
acceptance of a theory within the relevant scientific community. The
inaccurate assessment in Black of the scientific reliability of RTS indi-
cates that the court did not adhere to the standard in this case.
Research conducted on RTS since the original description of the syn-
drome in 1974 confirms that RTS is a medically recognized reaction to
extreme stress. The psychiatric profession recognizes rape as a cause
of a serious anxiety disorder. Most courts that have addressed the
issue admit expert testimony on RTS. In analogous contexts, the
Washington Supreme Court itself has recognized that expert testi-
mony can explain behavior that is beyond the experience of the aver-
age juror.
The court does not need to exclude RTS testimony altogether.
Where this testimony is directly relevant to the facts of a rape case, it
can assist the jury in deciding the issue of consent, while at the same
time avoiding unfair prejudice to the defendant. The court could min-
imize the possibility of unfair prejudice to the defendant in rape cases
by limiting the expert's testimony so that it does not comment directly
on the credibility of the alleged victim. As additional protection for
the defendant, the court could implement procedural safeguards that
ensure the testimony's probative value. Finally, the court could
instruct the jury on the proper weight to be given to expert testimony.
1. 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
2. Rape trauma syndrome is the stress response pattern of the victim following forced, non-
consenting sexual activity. Burgess, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 97 (1983). The
state offers the testimony on behalf of the victim, usually after the defendant has claimed that the
victim consented to sexual relations.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Scientific Recognition of Rape Trauma Syndrome
1. The Original Study
The first researchers to describe RTS, Ann Wolbert Burgess and
Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, found it to be an acute stress reaction to a
life-threatening situation.3 The syndrome usually includes two phases.
In the first phase, the victim experiences disorganization in lifestyle.
Emotional reactions range from fear, humiliation, and embarrassment
to anger and a desire for revenge. Although fear of physical violence
and death dominates the victim's feelings, self-blame is also very
prominent.4 During this phase, when the victim feels the impact of the
rape most severely, she may exhibit one of two widely divergent emo-
tional styles. In the expressed style, feelings of fear, anger, and anxiety
are manifested through crying, sobbing, smiling, restlessness, and
tenseness. In the controlled style, feelings are masked by a calm, com-
posed, or subdued demeanor.'
The second phase involves a long-term process of physical and emo-
tional reorganization. This phase often begins about two to three
weeks after the attack. Symptoms may include change in residence,
travel to sources of support in other cities, nightmares, and various
phobic reactions.6 Although all victims do not experience the same
symptoms in the same sequence, 7 victims consistently experience the
disorganization phase. Many victims thereafter experience mild to
moderate symptoms in the reorganization process. Few victims report
no symptoms.8
3. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981, 982 (1974).
The description of RTS in this section is taken from this study, which was based on analysis of
the symptoms exhibited by 92 adult female victims of forcible rape. These subjects were selected
from a total of 146 patients admitted during a one-year period (July 20, 1972 through July 19,
1973) to the emergency ward of Boston City Hospital with a complaint of rape. Id. at 981.
4. A rape victim commonly feels that she should have handled the situation differently,
regardless of the appropriateness of her actual response. Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim:
Psychodynamic Considerations, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 408, 410 (1976).
5. The "controlled" reaction to rape was noted in an earlier study as well. Sutherland &
Scherl, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 503, 507-08
(1970).
6. These reactions include fear of indoors or outdoors (depending on where the rape
occurred), fear of being alone, fear of crowds, and sexual fears. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra
note 3, at 984.
7. Various factors affect coping behavior, including ego strength, social network support, and
the way the woman is treated as a victim. Id. at 983.
8. Id.; see also Kilpatrick, Veronen & Best, Factors Predicting Psychological Distress Among
Rape Victims, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE: THE STUDY AND TREATMENT OF POST-TRAUMATIC
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2. Subsequent Research on Rape Trauma Syndrome
Several researchers have criticized the methods employed in both
the Burgess and Holmstrom study and some of the early studies that
followed.' Recognizing these shortcomings, more recent studies
addressed the problems of the earlier work with carefully designed
sampling strategies and more rigorous study methodologies. Most of
these recent studies assessed control groups of non-raped women,
along with the experimental groups of raped women. 10 These studies
employed standardized, objective psychological tests.1 Results uni-
formly indicated higher levels of fear, anxiety, and depression among
victims of sexual assault than among non-victims. 2 Several of these
studies also documented long-term reactions to rape, some persisting
up to several years after the rape.'3 These studies have both confirmed
and extended the results of the original Burgess and Holmstrom study.
STRESS DISORDER 113, 137 (C. Figley ed. 1985) (assessment of rape victims shortly after the
assault documented the fact that the nondistressed victim is the exception rather than the rule).
9. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, Veronen & Resick, The Aftermath of Rape: Recent Empirical
Findings, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658, 658-59 (1979); Ruch & Leon, Type of Sexual
Assault Trauma: A Multidimensional Analysis of a Short-term Panel, 8 VICTIMOLOGY 237,
238-39 (1983). These studies criticized earlier studies for such methodological shortcomings as:
Unrepresentative, inadequate, or biased samples; lack of long-term assessment of victims; failure
to use standardized, reliable instruments for measuring responses to rape; inadequate description
of crucially important aspects of research methodology; and lack of an appropriate comparison
group of women who were not raped (a "control" group).
10. See, eg., Becker, Skinner & Abel, Sequelae of Sexual Assault: The Survivor's Perspective,
in THE SExuAL AGGRESSOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON TREATMENT 240, 244-46 (1983);
Ellis, A Review of Empirical Rape Research: Victim Reactions and Response to Treatment, 3
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 473, 474-75 (1983); Kilpatrick, Resick & Veronen, Effects of a
Rape Experience: A Longitudinal Study, 37 J. Soc. ISSUES 105, 112 (1981); Resick, Calhoun,
Atkeson & Ellis, Social Adjustment in Victims of SexualAssault, 49 3. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 705, 706 (1981); Veronen, Kilpatrick & Resick, Treating Fear andAnxiety in Rape
Victims: Implications for the Criminal Justice System, in PERSPECTIVES ON VICTIMOLOGY 148,
151 (W. Parsonage ed. 1979). Most researchers took care to select the control groups from
among women whose race, age, and economic status matched those of the victims. Most selected
women from the same neighborhood as the victims to provide some control for other social class,
environmental, and cultural variables.
11. See, eg., Ellis, supra note 10, at 477; Frank, Turner & Stewart, Initial Response to Rape:
The Impact of Factors Within the Rape Situation, 2 J. BEHAV. ASSESSMENT 39, 44 (1980);
Kilpatrick, Resick & Veronen, supra note 10, at 113; Kilpatrick, Veronen & Resick, supra note 9,
at 660-61.
12. See, eg., Becker, Skinner & Abel, supra note 10, at 249, 253; Ellis, supra note 10, at 477;
Kilpatrick, Resick & Veronen, supra note 10, at 111; Kilpatrick, Veronen & Best, supra note 8, at
114; Kilpatrick, Veronen & Resick, supra note 9, at 662-65.
13. See, eg., Kilpatrick, Veronen & Best, supra note 8, at 114-15, 136; Nadelson, Notman,
Zackson & Gornick, A Follow-Up Study of Rape Victims, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1266,
1266-67, 1269 (1982).
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3. Current Status of Rape Trauma Syndrome
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-
III"),14 the American Psychiatric Association's authoritative refer-
ence, includes rape in the narrow category of stressors that cause Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD").5 The 1987 revision of this ref-
erence ("DSM-III(R)") points out that stressors known to produce
PTSD would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, and usually
create feelings of intense fear, terror, and helplessness.' 6 Symptoms of
PTSD include reexperiencing the traumatic event,17 avoidance of stim-
uli associated with the event or numbing of general responsiveness, 8
and increased arousal.19 In avoiding reminders of the trauma, the vic-
tim may experience amnesia with respect to some aspect of the
event.2o
A number of the symptoms of PTSD parallel RTS symptoms. Like
rape victims, those who suffer from PTSD often exhibit impulsive
behavior, such as suddenly changing place of residence, unexplained
absences, or other changes in lifestyle.21 The prominent feeling of self-
blame observed in rape victims is also characteristic of PTSD, and
may result in self-defeating behavior or suicidal actions.22
14. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. A revised third edition, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(3d ed. revised 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III(R)] was published in 1987.
15. DSM-III, supra note 14, at 236; DSM-III(R), supra note 14, at 248. The essential feature
of PTSD is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically distressing
event that is outside the range of usual human experience. The other stressors that cause PTSD
are: Military combat; natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes; accidental disasters,
including car accidents with serious physical injury, airplane crashes, large fires, and collapse of
physical structures; and deliberately caused disasters such as bombing, torture, and death camps.
The disorder is apparently more severe and longer lasting when the stressor is of human design.
PTSD is not caused by such common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness,
business losses, and marital conflict. DSM-III(R), supra, at 247-48.
16. DSM-III(R), supra note 14, at 247.
17. Id.
18. Id. Diminished responsiveness to external stimuli, also described as "psychic numbness"
or "emotional anesthesia," usually begins shortly after the traumatic event. Id. at 248.
19. Id. Increased arousal is manifested by difficulty in sleeping, irritability, difficulty in
concentrating, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, or physiological reactions to events
that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event (e.g., a woman who was raped in an
elevator breaks out in a sweat when entering any elevator). Id. at 250.
20. Id. at 248.
21. Id. at 249.
22. Id.
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Studies specifically addressing rape victims verify that these women
experience the symptoms of PTSD.23 Within the framework of the
PTSD symptomatology, researchers have observed a variety of behav-
ioral patterns particularly characteristic of rape-induced trauma. For
example, rape victims commonly delay reporting the incident,24 and
many experience some memory loss.
2 5
B. Judicial Treatment of Expert Testimony on
Rape Trauma Syndrome
The Washington Supreme Court is one of very few courts which
categorically reject expert testimony on RTS.26 A few others admit
the testimony readily, even allowing an expert to offer an opinion that
the victim was raped.27 Most courts, however, while admitting the
23. See, eg., Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome and Post Traumatic Stress
Response, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 49 (A. Burgess ed. 1985);
Ellis, supra note 10, at 487; Kilpatrick, Veronen & Best, supra note 8, at 116-18; Nadelson,
Notman, Zackson & Gornick, supra note 13, at 1269; Wilson, Smith & Johnson, A Comparative
Analysis of PTSD Among Various Survivor Groups, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE: THE STUDY
AND TREATMENT OF POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 142, 167 (C. Figley ed. 1985)
(finding that the level of PTSD symptoms exhibited by rape victims is second only to that of
Vietnam combat veterans, despite a lack of statistical significance due to small sample size); see
also Martin, Warfield & Braen, Physician's Management of the Psychological Aspects of Rape, 249
J. A.M.A. 501 (1983) (based on symptoms of PTSD, several physicians provided guidelines on
how to lessen the psychological trauma experienced by a rape victim).
24. A rape victim often delays the report longer when she knows her assailant. See, e.g., S.
KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 188-90 (1979) (review of several
studies indicated that a substantial number of women delay reporting rape, and that the closer
the relationship between the victim and the attacker the longer the delay); Stewart, Hughes,
Frank, Anderson, Kendall & West, The Aftermath of Rape." Profiles of Immediate and Delayed
Treatment Seekers, 175 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 90, 92 (1987) (among a sample of
highly distressed women who had been raped two months to over three years before requesting
help, nearly 73% knew their assailants, as compared with only 50% of immediate treatment
seekers). The feelings of intense fear and helplessness associated with PTSD may be exaggerated
when the victim knows that her assailant could find her and retaliate if she reports the attack.
Delay in reporting may also be related to the "psychic numbness" or to the self-blame
associated with PTSD. See supra note 18 ("psychic numbness"), and text accompanying note 22
(self-blame).
25. See, eg., Horowitz, Wilner, Kaltreider & Alvarez, Signs and Symptoms of Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 85, 88 (1980) (memory failure is part of the
denial syndrome of PTSD); Sutherland & Scherl, supra note 5, at 504 (during the acute reaction
immediately following a rape, the victim is frequently unable to talk about the incident, or to
describe the assailant); Veronen, Kilpatrick & Resick, supra note 10, at 156-57 (because rape
victims can be expected to remember more as their anxiety lessens, it is inappropriate to impugn
a victim's veracity based on the predictable changes in the information which she gives to police
over time).
26. See infra notes 41-43.
27. See, e.g., State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986); State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d
918 (Mont. 1984). In both of these cases, testimony that rape caused the Post-Traumatic Stress
Syndrome observed in the victim was held admissible.
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testimony, carefully limit it to avoid undue prejudice to the defendant.
These courts do not allow the expert to give an opinion as to whether
the victim is telling the truth. Rather, they limit the expert's testimony
to providing general information about RTS, thus allowing the jury to
more knowledgeably address the issues presented.
1. Testimony Admitted
a. Per Se Admissibility
Some courts find expert testimony on RTS relevant and admissible.
These courts allow qualified experts to examine the alleged victim
prior to trial, and to testify that the victim's emotional and psychologi-
cal trauma is consistent with RTS.28 They reason that such testimony
does not invade the province of the jury, but carries the same weight as
any other evidence.29 Subjecting the expert to cross-examination pro-
vides defense counsel with the opportunity to point out deficiencies in
the testimony and overcome its prejudicial effect.3" The jury may then
determine its weight.3" Such evidence can assist the jury in resolving
the question of consent. 32 These courts impose virtually no restric-
tions on admissibility of RTS testimony.
b. Jury Instructions Required
Courts may also provide jury instructions to safeguard against prej-
udice from the use of expert testimony.33 The trial court instructs the
jury to consider the expert's testimony along with whatever other evi-
dence is submitted on the question of the alleged victim's credibility.
One court noted that such testimony cannot invade the province of the
28. See, e.g., State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d 1290 (1985) (psychiatrist testified that the
victim's mental state was consistent with her account of the rape); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645,
647 P.2d 1292 (1982) (psychiatrist who examined the victim was allowed to testify that the
victim was suffering from RTS); State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986) (psychiatrist
testified that the victim suffered from PTSD and that, in his opinion, the cause of the disorder
was the rape complained of by the victim); State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918 (Mont. 1984)
(psychiatric nurse was allowed to testify that the victim's acute depression and severe headaches
were manifestations of a post-traumatic stress syndrome caused by rape).
29. See, e.g., Huey, 699 P.2d at 1294; Marks, 647 P.2d at 1299.
30. See, e.g., Huey, 699 P.2d at 1294; Marks, 647 P.2d at 1299; Allewalt, 517 A.2d at 751.
31. See, e.g., Huey, 699 P.2d at 1294; Marks, 647 P.2d at 1299; Liddell, 685 P.2d at 923.
32. See, e.g., Huey, 699 P.2d at 1294; Liddell, 685 P.2d at 923.
33. See, e.g., Allewalt, 517 A.2d at 751 (jury instructions can help to prevent any impression
that the psychiatric opinion is like a "chemical reaction"); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084,
475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1984) (expert testimony on RTS was admissible, so long as adequate and
proper jury instructions were provided).
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jury unless the court instructs the jury that the expert's opinion is
binding.
3 4
c. Expert's Testimony May Not Address Credibility of Alleged Rape
Victim
Many courts allow testimony on RTS only if the expert does not
comment on the credibility of the alleged victim.35 An expert may
testify only that the behavior of the alleged victim is consistent with a
clinically observed pattern known as RTS, and may not offer an opin-
ion as to whether the alleged victim is telling the truth. Rather, the
expert's function is merely to explain the symptoms and behaviors
described in the scientific literature on RTS, and to testify as to
whether the victim exhibits these symptoms. 36
d. Expert May Only Testify to 'Explain Alleged Victim's Unusual
Behavior
Some courts allow RTS testimony only to explain behavior of the
alleged victim which could appear unusual or counterintuitive to a
jury. 7 These courts allow the testimony to rebut an implication that
certain behavior is inconsistent with a claim of nonconsensual sexual
relations. Courts have admitted RTS testimony to provide a possible
explanation for the victim delaying her report of the rape,38 for mem-
34. Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 510 A.2d 735, 742 n.7 (1986), appeal
granted, 515 Pa. 574, 527 A.2d 535 (1987).
35. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1987) (testimony of two psychiatric
social workers that the victim's behavior was consistent with clinically observed behavior
patterns known among professionals as RTS was admissible, absent an opinion by the experts as
to the credibility of the victim); State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Mo. App.) (absent testimony
that the complaining witness suffered from RTS or an opinion from the physicians that the
complaining witness was raped, testimony of two physicians with respect to psychological
aftereffects on forcible rape victims was admissible), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); Reid, 475
N.Y.S.2d at 743 (expert testimony on RTS was admissible, but expert was not allowed to testify
as to whether she believed the victim); Gallagher, 510 A.2d at 744 (testimony of an expert on
RTS, which did not express an opinion about the victim's veracity, did not invade the province of
the jury by impermissibly bolstering the victim's credibility).
36. State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 689 P.2d 822 (1984) (explicitly reaffirming State v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982)).
37. See, eg., supra notes 24 and 25 for description of such behavior.
38. See, eg., People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987) (expert testimony on RTS
admitted where defense counsel indicated that victim's delay of 89 days in reporting the assault
would be subject to serious attack at trial); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741
(1984) (expert testimony on RTS was allowed to explain 11-year-old victim's delay in reporting
the rape, as well as her letters to the defendant recanting her accusations while the case awaited
trial); see also Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d-471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982) (civil case in
which expert testimony indicated that feelings of fear, shame, and guilt, resulting in a failure to
speak of or report the experience, are very common reactions for rape victims); Scadden v. State,
1069
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:1063, 1988
ory loss or faulty identification of the defendant, 39 or to rebut popular
misconceptions concerning rape victims.4°
2. Testimony Excluded
Courts which, like the Black court, categorically exclude expert tes-
timony on RTS are in the minority. These courts point to a few spe-
cific objections to the testimony. For example, some courts have
found RTS testimony inadmissible because the expert gave an opinion
about the victim's credibility,4" or because the testimony purported to
establish conclusively that a rape had occurred.4 2 Even those courts
which exclude the testimony frequently indicate that it would be
admissible in a proper case.4 3
732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987) (expert testimony was allowed to rebut the implication by the
defendant that a delay in reporting was inconsistent with a claim of nonconsensual sexual
relations).
39. See, e.g., State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 415 A.2d 320 (1980) (physician who had
examined the complainant within several hours of the alleged rape was allowed to testify that
memory loss was not unusual in the case of rape victims); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 353 Pa.
Super. 426, 510 A.2d 735 (1986), appeal granted, 515 Pa. 574, 527 A.2d 535 (1987) (expert
testimony on RTS was allowed to explain a psychological phenomenon beyond the knowledge
and experience of the average juror, where the victim was unable to identify the assailant two
weeks after the incident but identified him four years later).
40. While the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue of RTS directly, the court held in
United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1984), that expert testimony of a psychiatrist on
PTSD was admissible to explain unusual behavior of two alleged victims of forced prostitution.
Claiming consensual sexual relations, the defendant pointed out that the two alleged victims had
failed to take advantage of opportunities to escape or call for help. Expert testimony on PTSD
and the stages in forced prostitution leading to a feeling of complete helplessness was admissible
under FED. R. EvID. 702.
41. See, e.g., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982) (expert's opinion that the
complaining witness had not fantasized the rape was reversible error).
42. See, e.g., People v. Pullins, 145 Mich. App. 414, 378 N.W.2d 502 (1985) (expert testimony
on RTS was not admissible to prove that a rape in fact occurred, but the court explicitly reserved
opinion on the admissibility of RTS evidence where consent is the defense); State v. Taylor, 663
S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (where there was no evidence that the expert was qualified to relate the
specific incident that caused the victim's symptoms, the expert's conclusion that the complainant
suffered from RTS as a result of the rape incident which she described went beyond the proper
limits of opinion expression); see also People v. Skinner, 153 Mich. App. 815, 396 N.W.2d 548
(1986) (RTS evidence properly admitted where the expert made no claim that the characteristics
of the victim established that she was raped); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982)
(two dissenting justices emphasized that the expert in that case did not testify as to whether, in
his opinion, the rape actually occurred).
43. For example, although the court in People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203
Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984), rejected expert testimony on RTS to prove that a rape occurred, the court
cited approvingly cases allowing such testimony to rebut a defendant's suggestion that the
victim's conduct was inconsistent with a claim of rape. The court noted that such testimony may
play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of widely held misconceptions about rape
and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.
Id. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal Rptr. at 457-58.
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II. STATE v. BLACK
A. Facts and Disposition
In State v. Black,' the defendant's conviction of third-degree rape
arose from an incident involving a sixteen year old girl who was a
close family friend and neighbor. The defendant admitted to inter-
course with the alleged victim, but asserted that it was consensual.
The alleged victim maintained that the defendant forced her to have
intercourse with him. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial
court admitted a rape crisis counselor's testimony that the complain-
ant fit the profile of a rape victim."
The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that there
was insufficient foundation for admission of the RTS testimony.a The
court found that the record failed to establish RTS as sufficiently relia-
ble and accepted within the relevant scientific community.47 The only
bases for RTS testimony presented by the rape crisis counselor were
that "every rape victim that [she had] seen" exhibited consistent
symptoms, 48 and that she knew of one study that corroborated her
observations.49 The court of appeals explicitly declined to decide
whether RTS evidence would be admissible under a properly laid
foundation.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, remanding the case for a
new trial without the RTS testimony.50 It went one step further than
the court of appeals, and held that expert testimony on RTS would be
inadmissible under all circumstances. 51
B. Reasoning of the Court
L The Majority Opinion
The Black court found that expert testimony on the characteristics
of RTS does not meet the requirements of Washington Rule of Evi-
dence ("ER") 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testi-
44. 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
45. Id. at 339, 745 P.2d at 14.
46. State v. Black, 46 Wash. App. 259, 730 P.2d 698 (1986), aff'd, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745
P.2d 12 (1987).
47. Id. at 263, 730 P.2d at 701.
48. Black 109 Wash. 2d at 339, 745 P.2d at 14.
49. The rape crisis counselor referred to the original Burgess & Holmstrom study on RTS,
supra note 3. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 339, 745 P.2d at 14.
50. Id. at 350, 745 P.2d at 19.
51. Id. at 338, 745 P.2d at 13.
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mony.5" The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to
require that the witness is qualified as an expert, the testimony is based
upon an explanatory theory generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity, and the testimony is helpful to the trier of fact.53
In applying ER 702 to the facts of the case before it,54 the court
noted that Frye v. United States" governs the admissibility of expert
testimony based on new scientific theories.56 Under Frye, the scientific
principle underlying the testimony must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. "
In determining whether RTS met the Frye standard, the court looked
to the scientific literature on RTS. The court concluded that symp-
toms associated with RTS embrace such a broad spectrum of human
behavior that the syndrome is a highly questionable means of identify-
ing victims of rape.58  The court also discussed the methodological
shortcomings of studies defining RTS, finding that these shortcomings
cast further doubt on whether RTS can prove reliably that an alleged
victim was raped.59
In comparing RTS evidence to fingerprints and blood tests, the
court concluded that, unlike these other types of scientific evidence,
RTS is not intended to be a fact-finding device.6" The court reasoned
that, because the origins of the RTS theory are in clinical therapy and
therapists are trained to avoid judging the credibility of their clients,
RTS testimony cannot be helpful in determining whether a woman
52. ER 702 states that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise." WASH. R. EVID. 702. This rule is the same as FED. R. EvID. 702.
53. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 596, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984). See generally K.
TEGLAND, 5A WASHINGTON PRACTICE, EVIDENCE § 288, at 25 (2d ed. 1982) ("The
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 will depend upon whether the witness qualifies
as an expert and upon whether an expert opinion would be helpful to the trier of fact.... In
addition, in a criminal case the court should consider whether the expert's opinion is based upon
a generally accepted explanatory theory ....").
54. Because the defendant did not challenge the expert's qualifications on appeal, the court
addressed only the second and third parts of the three-part test under ER 702. Black, 109 Wash
2d at 341, 745 P.2d at 15.
55. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
56. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 342, 745 P.2d at 15.
57. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
58. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 344, 745 P.2d at 16.
59. Id. at 345-46, 745 P.2d at 17.
60. Id. at 347, 745 P.2d at 18 (quoting People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-50, 681 P.2d
291, 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 459 (1984)).
1072
Vol. 63:1063, 1988
Rape Trauma Syndrome
was raped. 1 The court found that the general symptoms of RTS
could result from any stressful sexual experience, not only rape.62
Next, the court addressed another requirement for admissibility of
expert testimony under ER 702: whether the testimony is helpful to
the trier of fact. If the prejudicial effect of expert testimony outweighs
its probative value, such testimony is inadmissible because it does not
assist the trier of fact.63 The court found the RTS testimony proffered
in Black to be unfairly prejudicial because it constituted an opinion as
to the guilt of the defendant, and therefore invaded the exclusive prov-
ince of the jury. 4 The court also found that the term "rape trauma
syndrome" was inherently prejudicial,6 but it added that an expert's
purposeful avoidance of the term does not render RTS testimony
admissible.6 6 Acknowledging that the prosecution may offer lay testi-
mony concerning emotional or psychological trauma suffered by a
complainant after an alleged rape, the court concluded that the relia-
bility of RTS does not surpass the quality of "common sense evalua-
tion present in jury deliberations."'67
2. The Concurring Opinion
Three justices concurred in the result,68 noting that the prosecution
failed to lay even a rudimentary foundation for the expert testimony,
and that the expert did not appear to be qualified to testify on the
subject matter6 9 However, these justices disagreed with the majority's
approach of closing the door on admission of RTS expert testimony.
They pointed out that, under some circumstances, a judge or jury may
need assistance in understanding the evidence before the court.70 The
61. Id.
62. Id. at 344, 745 P.2d at 16-17 (citing Notman & Nadelson, supra note 4, at 408; Note,
Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1696 (1984)).
63. Black 109 Wash. 2d at 348, 745 P.2d at 18.
64. Id
65. The court found that the term carries with it an implied opinion that the alleged victim is
telling the truth, and that it constitutes a statement that the defendant is guilty of rape. Id. at
349, 745 P.2d at 19 (citing State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo. 1984)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 350, 745 P.2d at 19 (quoting State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)).
68. There was no dissenting opinion in Black
69. Black 109 Wash. 2d at 350, 745 P.2d at 19 (Utter, J., concurring in result). The majority
did not consider the qualifications of the expert (the first prong of the test for admissibility of
expert testimony under ER 702).
70. Id. at 350-51, 745 P.2d at 20. The concurring opinion noted this is especially true with
rape, where the subject matter is strange, emotional, and burdened with historical assumptions
and misapprehensions. Id. The concurring opinion went on to cite State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230,
424 A.2d 720, 734 (1981), in which a dissenting justice argued that the complainant willingly
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concurring justices agreed with the majority that RTS evidence should
not be used to prove rape. They reserved judgment, however, in those
cases where the defendant brings the mental state or behavior of the
alleged victim into question to show that a rape could not have
occurred.71 In such cases, the State should be permitted to rebut the
defendant's theory with expert testimony showing that it is possible
that a rape did occur.72 The concurring justices reasoned that this use
of expert testimony does not invade the province of the finder of fact;
rather, it gives the determination of the ultimate fact at issue back to
the jury.7 3 Noting the history of prejudice against rape victims mani-
fested in the judicial system,74 they concluded that the court should
not deny juries the potential benefit of a body of knowledge accepted
in many other jurisdictions.75
III. ANALYSIS
RTS evidence meets the requirements of ER 702. The theory is gen-
erally accepted in the scientific community, and the testimony is help-
ful to the trier of fact. In assessing the acceptance of RTS by the
relevant scientific community, the court ignored much of the recent
literature which validates RTS as a description of common reactions
to rape, and which confirms rape as a cause of PTSD. In determining
whether RTS testimony is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, the
court looked to whether this testimony would be helpful to the jury.
The court misread the description of PTSD in DSM-III, and mistak-
enly found that the stressors causing this disorder are within the aver-
age juror's experience. The court also mistakenly concluded that RTS
may be caused by any sexually stressful experience. These errors led
to the exclusion of RTS testimony in Black, an exclusion that is incon-
sistent with the Washington Supreme Court's acceptance of other
engaged in intercourse, although the defendant choked her, reasoning that because she had air
enough to plead with him the choking was not serious enough to find a rape. Black, 109 Wash.
2d at 355, 745 P.2d at 22.
71. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 351-52, 745 P.2d at 20 (Utter, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 352, 745 P.2d at 20.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 354-57, 745 P.2d at 21-23. The concurring opinion noted the formerly widespread
requirement that a complainant's report of rape be corroborated by some independent source.
The legislature eliminated this requirement in Washington. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020(1)
(1987). The chastity of a rape complainant was formerly considered probative on the issue of
credibility, leading to humiliating attacks by the defense on rape victims' reputations. The
legislature remedied this with the "rape shield" statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020(2),(3)
(1987).
75. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 357, 745 P.2d at 23 (Utter, J., concurring).
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expert psychological testimony to explain behavior that is outside the
experience of the average juror.
A. The Relevant Scientific Community Accepts Rape Trauma
Syndrome
L Recent Studies Support the Validity of Rape Trauma Syndrome
Much of the relevant scientific literature is in conflict with the
court's position that methodological weaknesses cast "grave doubt"76
on the scientific reliability of RTS.77 While the studies that the court
cited in support of its position mentioned the shortcomings of prior
studies, the purpose of the later studies was to remedy these shortcom-
ings.78 Many researchers note that current studies have adequately
compensated for most of the deficiencies of the earlier clinical
research.79 These studies largely confirm the original description of
RTS.80
2. The Therapeutic Origin of Rape Trauma Syndrome Does Not
Diminish Its Validity
The court concluded that because RTS was developed as a thera-
peutic tool, it is not scientifically reliable. 8 However, studies validat-
ing RTS have been conducted in clinical research settings, using valid
76. Black 109 Wash. 2d at 345, 745 P.2d at 17.
77. See supra notes 10-13.
78. See, eg., Kilpatrick, Veronen & Resick, supra note 9, at 658-62 (1979) (cited by Black,
109 Wash. 2d at 345, 745 P.2d at 17). The introduction to this study pointed out that prior
studies suffered from four severe methodological limitations: First, inadequate selection or
description of the sample of victims; second, failure to include an appropriate comparison group
of women who have not been raped; third, failure to use standardized, reliable instruments for
measuring responses to rape; and fourth, inadequate description of crucially important aspects of
study methodology. The study proceeded to specifically address, and correct, these faults.
79. See, eg., Borgida, Frazier & Swim, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: The Use of Expert
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, in PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INVESTIGATION 347,
354-55 (1987) ("Current rape victim research is methodologically more sophisticated. These
studies have compensated for most of the deficiencies in the earlier clinical research ....").
80. See supra notes 10-13; see also Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The
Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN.
L. REV. 395, 448 (1985) ("Over ten years have elapsed since the RTS theory was first advanced,
research on rape victimology has mushroomed, yet no one writing on rape victimology seriously
contests the RTS theory.").
81. State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 347, 745 P.2d 12, 18 (1987) (quoting People v. Bledsoe,
36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-50, 681 P.2d 291, 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 459 (1984)) (because the function
of rape counselors is to help their clients deal with the trauma they are experiencing, the
historical accuracy of the clients' descriptions of the traumatizing event is not vital to their task).
Several researchers have recommended using RTS as a diagnostic tool, as well as for
therapeutic purposes. See, eg., A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY
449 (1979); Stewart, Hughes, Frank, Anderson, Kendall & West, supra note 24, at 94.
1075
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:1063, 1988
scientific research methodologies. 2  Furthermore, this criticism
assumes that false claims of rape are common. Statistics strongly sug-
gest that the percentage of actual false reports in rape cases may be as
low as or lower than most other crimes.83 Finally, the Washington
Supreme Court admits other types of expert psychological testimony,
including testimony on battered woman syndrome and on sexually
abused children,84 that are based on theories with similar origins.85
3. The Scientific Community Agrees Rape Trauma Syndrome
Evidence Should Be Admissible
A recent survey of experts on rape and PTSD indicated consensus
in the scientific community on the legal validity of RTS.86 Two psy-
chologists designed a questionnaire to address such issues as the
admissibility of expert testimony on RTS, its helpfulness to jurors, and
the scientific status of the current database on rape trauma. 87
Responses to these questions indicated support for the use of RTS
evidence. 88
82. See supra notes 10-13; see also Horowitz, Wilner, Kaltreider & Alvarez, supra note 25, at
86 ("We provide data on a clinical population of persons with posttraumatic stress disorder, so
defined by themselves and by clinicians through instruments and interviews designed with the
intention of exploring the quality of these experiences.").
83. See S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 24, at 207-13, for a review of the various indices of
"unfounded" (i.e., false) reports of rape from around the United States. One study that excluded
police bias due to the victim's lack of cooperation and other behavior of the victim estimated that
the actual frequency of false reports in rape cases was only 2%. Id. at 212; see also Massaro,
supra note 80, at 452 n.238 (noting the "documented and marked tendency of women not to
report 'questionable' rapes .... "); Kilpatrick, Veronen & Best, supra note 8, at 116 (in one study,
only 29% of the women who had been raped reported the incident to the police).
84. See, e.g., State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) (battered woman
syndrome); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984) (sexual abuse of children).
85. See, e.g., McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 19 n. 114 (1986) (research on child sexual abuse is grounded in reports of the
victims and on "anecdotal" studies of a small number of cases in minute detail); Recent
Development, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to the Use of Battered Woman
Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L. REV. 741, 742 (1982) (clinical psychologists' theories
on the psychological makeup of battered women are based on information gathered during
interviews with battered women).
86. Frazier & Borgida, Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma
Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101, 111-12 (1988). Based on a review
of the literature, 22 experts who had conducted at least two empirical studies on rape were
selected as respondents. Id. at 110. Although these people are not legal experts, they are
commonly called upon to testify as experts in court, and are familiar with the judicial standards
for acceptance of scientific evidence in their disciplines.
87. Id. at 106.
88. Id. at 111. The experts strongly agreed that the average juror is not so knowledgeable
about rape that expert testimony would not be helpful, that expert psychological testimony on
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B. Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome Is Helpful to
Jurors
1. The Stressors Causing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Are
Outside the Range of Common Experience
In stating that symptoms of PTSD may be triggered by such com-
mon events as simple bereavement, chronic illness, and marital con-
ffict, 9 the court misquoted DSM-III.9" The relevant passage states
instead that "[t]he stressor producing [PTSD] would evoke significant
symptoms of distress in most people, and is generally outside the range
of such common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness,
business losses, or marital conflict."91 This misreading of DSM-III led
to the court's conclusion that symptoms associated with RTS embrace
a broad spectrum of human behavior, and that the syndrome therefore
provides a highly questionable means of identifying rape victims. 92
The nature of the other stressors known to cause PTSD, such as air-
plane crashes, large fires, torture, bombing, and death camps, belies
this conclusion.93 Just as average jurors are not likely to be familiar
with common reactions to any of these events, neither are they likely
to be familiar with a victim's reaction to rape.
2. Research on Rape Trauma Syndrome Distinguishes Rape From
Other "Sexually Stressful Experiences"
The court further misconstrued scientific authority in concluding
that RTS symptoms are not caused exclusively by rape, but may be
caused by any "sexually stressful experience." 94 The sources that the
rape trauma should not be inadmissible because of concerns about its scientific reliability, and
that RTS is an example of PTSD as defined in DSM-III. Id.
89. "Similar symptoms may be triggered by any psychologically traumatic event that is
'generally outside the range of usual human experience', including simple bereavement, chronic
illness, [and] marital conflict .... State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 344, 745 P.2d 12, 16
(1987).
90. See supra note 14.
91. DSM-III, supra note 14, at 236. The parallel section of DSM-III(R) states that "[t]he
essential feature of this disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following a
psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience (i.e., outside
the range of such common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness, business losses,
and marital conflict)." DSM-III(R), supra note 14, at 247. The court also lists "automobile
accidents" as a cause of PTSD, Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 344, 745 P.2d at 16, while both medical
authorities cite this stressor as "car accidents with serious physical injury." DSM-III, supra, at
236; DSM-III(R), supra, at 248.
92. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 344, 745 P.2d at 16.
93. See supra note 15.
94. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 344-45, 745 P.2d at 16-17.
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court cited in support of this conclusion95 refer to the Burgess and
Holmstrom study on RTS.9 6 The authors of the two studies cited by
the court mistakenly stated that Burgess and Holmstrom included vic-
tims of sexual experiences that were merely stressful in the sample
group of women upon which they based the RTS theory. Burgess and
Holmstrom, however, derived their theory on rape trauma from analy-
sis of the symptoms of only those women who were victims of forcible
rape.
97
3. Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome Is Not Unfairly
Prejudicial Because It Does Not Comment Directly on the
Guilt or Innocence of the Defendant
Use of RTS testimony to explain behavior of the alleged victim
which may initially appear unusual or counterintuitive to a jury does
not make a direct statement about the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant.98 Once the defendant "opens the door" by questioning some
behavior of the alleged victim which could appear to the average juror
to be inconsistent with a claim of rape, expert testimony could help the
jury to properly interpret this behavior. Washington courts allow
such rehabilitative use of expert testimony.99
Washington courts generally exclude testimony which assumes that,
because the defendant is a member of a recognizable class of people,
the defendant is statistically more likely to have committed a particu-
lar crime."° Properly used, RTS testimony does not speculate on the
statistical likelihood that the victim was raped. 1 ' Researchers do not
95. Notman & Nadelson, supra note 4, at 408; Note, supra note 62, at 1696.
96. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 3. This was the study that first described RTS.
97. Id. at 981. The researchers divided the 146 patients admitted to the emergency ward with
a complaint of rape into three categories: First, victims of forcible rape; second, victims in
situations to which they were an accessory due to their inability to consent; and third, victims of
sexually stressful situations. "The rape trauma syndrome delineated in this paper was derived
from an analysis of the symptoms of the 92 adult women in our sample who were victims of
forcible rape." Id.
98. See State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1982) (Wahl, J., dissenting) ("[Riape
trauma evidence is victim-oriented, explains victim injuries and is nonprejudicial to the character
of the defendant.").
99. See, e.g., State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 575, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984) ("Once a
witness's credibility is in issue, evidence tending to corroborate the testimony may, in the trial
court's discretion, be obtained from an expert witness.").
100. See, e.g., id. at 576, 683 P.2d at 180 (expert testimony that invites the jury to conclude
that, because the defendant knew the victim, he is statistically more likely to have sexually
abused her, should be excluded on retrial).
101. Improperly used, RTS testimony could invite the jury to conclude that, because the
victim exhibits the characteristics associated with RTS, she was raped. This would be highly
prejudicial to the defendant, since most cases in which RTS testimony is offered involve no
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even make the claim that there is a "typical" rape victim. 10 2 However,
commonly recognized reactions to rape are sufficiently specific that
they comprise a medically accepted symptomatoloy 1 3 When used
to explain reactions to a given stressor after these same reactions have
already been observed in the alleged victim, the testimony' merely
points out to a jury that certain behavior is not inconsistent with a
claim of rape.1 4
4. The Court Admits Similar Psychological Testimony
Properly used, expert testimony on RTS accords with Washington
Supreme Court precedent allowing expert psychological testimony to
explain behavior that is outside the common experience and under-
standing of the average juror.105 For example, courts admit expert
question as to the identity of the defendant. The issue is usually consent. Such improper use of
RTS testimony would invite the jury to conclude from the expert testimony that the defendant is
guilty.
102. See, eg., Borgida, Frazier & Swim, supra note 79, at 357 (the existence of individual
variability does not suggest that evidence regarding common rape victim reactions, which at this
time are well documented, is not helpful to jurors faced with making a determination regarding
consent); Kilpatrick, Veronen & Best, supra note 8, at 120-21 (because rape victims bring to the
experience significant differences in biographic and demographic characteristics, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the psychological distress produced by a rape might vary as a
function of the victim's characteristics and the nature of the rape itself).
103. DSM-III, supra note 14, at 236-39; DSM-III(R), supra note 14, at 247-51.
104. The court emphasized the proper use of expert psychological testimony on battered
woman syndrome in State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984). This case also
illustrates the proper use of RTS testimony. The defendant admitted killing her husband, but
asserted she acted in self-defense. Relying on State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312
(1984), the court pointed out that the defendant did not introduce expert testimony to show that,
in shooting her husband, she acted in conformity with behavioral characteristics said to comprise
battered woman syndrome. Rather, she offered the testimony to aid the jury in understanding
the reasonableness of her fear of her husband. In this context, the court noted, testimony on
battered woman syndrome was not offered as evidence of a pertinent character trait, but rather to
aid the trier of fact in understanding the evidence and determining a fact in issue, self-defense.
Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d at 195-96, 685 P.2d at 570.
RTS testimony could be admitted when offered for similar reasons. Properly used, it can aid
the jury in determining a fact in issue, such as whether certain behavior is consistent with a claim
of rape.
105. See, eg., Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316 (expert testimony, explaining why
a person suffering from the battered woman syndrome would fear increased aggression by her
mate but still not leave him or inform police or friends, is helpful to a jury in understanding a
phenomenon not within the competence of an ordinary lay person); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.
2d 566, 575-76, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984) (expert testimony, explaining that delay in reporting
sexual abuse is not unusual, is admissible where evidence suggests conduct from which the jury
could have inferred a behavioral response inconsistent with the witness's testimony).
The use of expert testimony on RTS can be limited to avoid the inference that, because the
alleged victim exhibits symptoms characteristic of RTS, the defendant raped her. See State v.
Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984) (expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
held admissible where the defendant offered the testimony to aid the jury in understanding the
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testimony on battered woman syndrome 10 6 to explain why the defend-
ant stayed with her mate long after the point when most jurors would
assume that a reasonable person would have left. 107 Without such tes-
timony, the jury might assume that the defendant's assertion that she
acted in self-defense was simply a post hoc rationalization for attack-
ing her mate. In State v. Allery, ' the court held expert testimony
admissible to explain why the defendant feared for her safety at the
time she shot her husband, although he was lying on the couch and
did not have a weapon.109 The record showed that, had the trial court
admitted the testimony, the expert on sexual assault would have
related her professional analysis of the behavioral and emotional pat-
terns exhibited by women who suffer from repeated physical abuse by
husbands or lovers. 110
The proper use of RTS testimony would be similar to this use of
testimony on battered woman syndrome.'11 Victims of rape often
reasonableness of her apprehension of imminent death or bodily injury, not to show that at the
time she shot her husband she was acting in conformity with behavioral characteristics said to
comprise the syndrome).
106. "A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical and
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without any concern for her rights." L. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN xv (1979).
107. Researchers have found that repeated batterings destroy the battered woman's volition,
resulting in "learned helplessness." She comes to believe that nothing she can do will alter the
situation, and does not try to escape from the relationship. Comment, The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 348,
351 (1982) (citing L. WALKER, supra note 106, at 49-50).
108. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984). In Allery, the founder of a sexual assault unit at
a hospital testified that battered woman syndrome is recognized by the psychiatric profession,
and is defined as a technical term of art in professional diagnostic textbooks. Id. at 596, 682 P.2d
at 315. Citing generally to two law review articles on the subject and to several jurisdictions
which admit this testimony, the court held expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
admissible. Id. at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
109. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316. Immediately after a serious threat from
her husband, the defendant tried unsuccessfully to escape through a bedroom window. Hearing
a noise from the kitchen, she thought her husband was getting a knife. She then loaded a
shotgun, moved to the kitchen area, and shot her husband while he remained lying on the couch.
Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 313-14.
110. Id. at 595, 682 P.2d at 315. The record also showed that, in the testimony held
admissible by the Washington Supreme Court in Allery, the expert would have opined that the
defendant displayed the behavioral and emotional characteristics of a battered woman. Id. This
use of the testimony goes beyond the proposed use of RTS evidence, which would exclude expert
testimony that the alleged victim displays RTS symptoms. See infra text accompanying notes
126-29.
111. Arguably, battered woman syndrome and RTS are not strictly analogous. Generally,
the defendant offers expert testimony on battered woman syndrome, while the complainant
(victim) offers expert testimony on RTS. However, in State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 278-79,
751 P.2d 1165, 1173 (1988), the court held expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
admissible to assist the jury in understanding the victim's delay in reporting the alleged rape.
The court recognized that "[a]t the heart of this issue is the question of whether we will extend
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exhibit reactions that would appear unreasonable to jurors, such as
delay in reporting the incident, an inability to consistently identify the
defendant, or a calm demeanor. 12 RTS testimony helps to demystify
this behavior, just as expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
does in another context.
RTS testimony also parallels expert testimony on the behavior of
children who have been sexually abused. Child victims of sexual abuse
commonly display behavior similar to that observed in adult victims of
rape.1 3 The court admits testimony about behavior of child abuse
victims where the child's behavior appears inconsistent with the claim
of sexual abuse."' Once the witness's credibility is in issue, an expert
may restore that credibility by giving the jury information which will
help them to understand the evidence.' 15 Similarly, when the behavior
of a rape victim would lead the jury to doubt her credibility, the court
should allow an expert to explain that the victim's behavior is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with a claim of rape. The jury may then better
understand reactions to a situation which is outside their common
experience.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Expert testimony on RTS should be admitted under the Frye test,
based on the strong evidence of acceptance in the relevant scientific
community. A synthesis of the evidentiary concerns expressed in ER
702, ER 703, and ER 403, however, would provide the court with a
the benefit of concepts this court has applied to defendants charged with a crime to those who are
victims of a crime." Id. at 265, 751 P.2d at 1166. The court concluded that "[n]either logic nor
law requires us to deny victims an opportunity to explain to a jury, through a qualified expert,
the reasons for conduct which would otherwise be beyond the average juror's understanding."
Id.
112. See supra notes 5, 24, 25, and accompanying text.
113. For example, as in rape cases, delay in reporting is very common in child sexual abuse
cases, and longer delay is correlated with the victim's acquaintance with the perpetrator of the
abuse. See, eg., State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 569, 683 P.2d 173, 176 (1984) (expert
testimony that a delay in reporting was found in over 50% of sexual abuse cases involving child
victims, and that longer delay was associated with cases where the child- knew the perpetrator,
was admissible); State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 852, 690 P.2d 1186, 1190 (1984) (admission
of expert opinion that delay in reporting is not unusual among sexually abused children, and that
length of delay is correlated with the relationship between the abuser and the child, was not an
abuse of the trial court's discretion).
Fear of reprisal and fear that the victim will not be believed motivate delay in both rape and
child sexual abuse cases. See, eg., Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d at 568, 683 P.2d at 176 (child victim of
sexual abuse feared she would not be believed if she told anyone); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d
1036, 1045 (Wyo. 1987) (fear may be instilled by the perpetrator who has threatened to harm the
child, and the biggest fear that sexually abused children have is that they will not be believed).
114. See supra note 113.
115. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d at 575, 683 P.2d at 180.
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more appropriate test than Frye for determining the admissibility of
psychological evidence."16  The Frye test was developed to shield
jurors from a tendency to treat novel scientific evidence as infallible.' 17
The average juror may well be unable to evaluate the reliability of a
new and highly technical scientific device or process." 8 However, the
same juror can comprehend psychological theories and clinical
research methods when these are explained by a qualified expert." 9
Studies indicate that the testimony of mental health experts does not
116. The Washington Rules of Evidence do not mention the Frye test. If the important
policies promoted by the test are reliability and avoidance of undue prejudice, ER 702 (requiring
that scientific or technical knowledge will assist the trier of fact), ER 703 (requiring that the facts
or data upon which the expert bases an opinion be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject), and ER 403 (providing for
the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence) are sufficient. R.
ARONSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON VII-14 (1987).
Over the last decade, the Frye test has been subjected to considerable criticism. See generally
Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (rather than using Frye as an analytical tool to decide
whether novel scientific evidence should be admitted, many courts apply it as a label to justify
their own views about the reliability of particular forensic techniques); McCormick, Scientific
Evidence: Defining a New Approach To Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879 (1982) (admissibility
of scientific evidence can best be determined within the procedural framework of traditional
relevancy and expert testimony analysis exemplified in Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and
702). Some jurisdictions have expressly rejected the test, reasoning that the admissibility of
scientific evidence is better regulated by the doctrines of relevancy and helpfulness to the finder of
fact. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 607 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Some courts find that the test
places too much emphasis on the amount of acceptance necessary before scientific principles or
technology may be admitted. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444, 447-
48 (1983) ("scientific nose-counting" not required for voice spectrogram to be admissible).
117. The testimony in Frye concerned results of a systolic blood pressure test (a forerunner of
the modern polygraph test). Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
118. Thus, the rigid standard of the Frye test may be appropriate when confronting jurors
with evidence based on such technological advances as radar speed meters, gas chromatography/
mass spectrometry (a highly accurate method of urinalysis drug testing), etc.
119. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, The Standard For Admitting Scientific Evidence. A Critique
From the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 567-69 (1982-83) (jurors are
capable of weighing and evaluating psychiatric testimony); see also Loftus & Monahan, Trial by
Data, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 270 (1980) (because the psychologist is not often testifying about
"magical devices" but rather is discussing research on human behavior, the statements more
properly belong in the category of medical testimony to which the general acceptance standard
has not usually been applied).
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overawe jurors. 120 In addition, the defendant may always cross-
examine such experts to aid the jury in evaluating this testimony.12 1
Regardless of whether the court evaluates RTS evidence under the
Frye test or under an alternative standard, certain procedural safe-
guards could minimize the possibility of unfair prejudice to the
defendant.
A. The Court Could Require a Pretrial Offer of Proof on the
Relevance of Rape Trauma Syndrome Testimony
The judge could weigh the probative value of RTS testimony against
its potential prejudicial effect, as set out in ER 403, to ensure that the
testimony would be more helpful than prejudicial.12 a A detailed pre-
trial offer of proof must show an appropriate "fit" between the pro-
posed expert testimony and the facts of the case at hand. 12 3 Where the
expert testimony clearly relates to the facts of the case, it has greater
120. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 119, at 569 (on the contrary, psychiatry has received
"extensive adverse publicity," especially since the 1982 trial of John Hinckley, Jr., thus making it
even less likely that jurors will be overawed by this type of evidence); see also H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 177 n.12 (Midway Reprint ed. 1986) (acquittal differential
between judge and jury remains roughly constant from cases with expert witnesses to those in
which this factor was absent); R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 169-70
(1967) (jury is too impressed with its importance as an institution and with its responsibility to
the court and the community to relinquish its decision-making power to an expert); Massaro,
supra note 80, at 444 (adherents cite no data supporting the assumption that jurors are overawed
by mental health experts).
121. See, eg., Massaro, supra note 80, at 446-47 (regardless of whether jurors give undue
.weight to such things as polygraph results, the same is not true with regard to expert
psychological testimony because such testimony does not involve a mechanical device impervious
to effective cross-examination).
122. "Preliminary questions concerning... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court ..... " WAsH. R. Evw. 104(a).
ER 403 provides guidelines for determining admissibility of evidence. WASH. R. EvID. 403
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury .... ").
123. See, e.g., State v. Moon, 45 Wash. App. 692, 699, 726 P.2d 1263, 1267 (1986) (where the
witness had a short, stressful view of the offender and was subject to "postevent information" in
the form of a photo montage and a lineup, expert testimony regarding the effects of stress and
"postevent information" on the reliability of eyewitness identification was improperly excluded).
Even in a situation where there are strong policy reasons for excluding a particular type of
evidence, the legislature provided for admission of the evidence where it is highly relevant to a
particular case. Washington's "rape shield" statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020(2),(3)
(1987), provides that evidence of a rape victim's past sexual behavior is not admissible to attack
the credibility of the victim. However, if factual similarities can be demonstrated between prior
consensual sex acts and the questioned sex acts which the defendant claims were consensual,
evidence of past sexual behavior is admissible. State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash. 2d 1, 11, 659 P.2d 514,
520 (1983). Similarly, where the witness in a rape case delays reporting the incident, or gives
conflicting accounts at various times, an expert should be allowed to explain reasons for this
conduct which are nevertheless consistent with a claim of rape.
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probative value. With appropriate safeguards,12 4 the judge could then
admit the testimony. 125
B. The Expert Would Not Interview the Victim
The court could limit RTS testimony to description and explanation
of the reactions of rape victims generally. 126 Such generalized expert
testimony about behaviors common to a class, rather than an evalua-
tion of the actions of an individual complainant, is the proper format
for this testimony. The expert would not be permitted to interview the
victim, and so could not testify as to her credibility.127 RTS testimony
would simply provide a general context in which the jury could more
knowledgeably address the issues. Used in this manner, RTS testi-
mony tends only to show that the victim's behavior is consistent with
RTS; it implies nothing about whether the victim suffers from RTS or
whether she has been raped.
C. The Court Could Instruct the Jury on the Weight
of Expert Testimony
An expert can never usurp the jury's duty of finding facts because
the jury can accept or reject the expert's evidence or opinion.1 28 Nev-
ertheless, the court can take steps to guard against any possibility that
the jury will give up its fact-finding function to an expert. The court
could explicitly instruct the jury that the expert's testimony does not
dispose of credibility issues, and that the jury must weigh the expert
testimony as it would any other evidence. All credibility determina-
tions would therefore remain with the jury.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 126-29.
125. The balancing test contemplated by ER 403 is left to the discretion of the trial court.
This decision will be overturned only for abuse of discretion. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d 412,
421, 705 P.2d 1182, 1189 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986).
126. See, e.g., People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951 (Colo. 1987) (the expert's testimony was
limited to the reactions of rape victims generally; she did not interview or contact the victim, did
not testify that the victim suffered from RTS or that the victim had been raped, and expressed no
opinion as to the truthfulness of the victim).
127. See, e.g., id; see also State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741, 761 (1986) (McAuliffe,
J., concurring) (while expert testimony on PTSD is admissible in rape prosecutions, the expert
should not be allowed to express an opinion that the complainant in a particular case suffered
from PTSD, nor should the expert be allowed to identify the particular trauma that precipitated
the condition).
128. Group Health Coop. v. Department of Revenue, 106 Wash. 2d 391, 399, 722 P.2d 787,
791 (1986).
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D. The Court Could Designate the Syndrome Using the Correct
Medical Term
The psychiatric community recognizes rape as a stressor which
causes PTSD. DSM-III does not mention the term "rape trauma syn-
drome." Use of the term "post-traumatic stress disorder" rather than
"rape trauma syndrome" reduces the potential prejudice of the testi-
mony. 29 The jury does not perceive the expert as offering an opinion
that the victim was raped, but rather an explanation of behaviors that
result from stressors of a certain magnitude.
V. CONCLUSION
In the case of State v. Black the court properly excluded the testi-
mony on rape trauma syndrome. The State laid no foundation for the
testimony, and the expert was arguably not qualified to present it. The
court, however, was not compelled to decide that expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome would be inadmissible in all rape trials. That
decision was based not on the facts of Black, but on a misinterpreta-
tion of the scientific literature, and on the erroneous belief that testi-
mony on rape trauma syndrome is always unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant.
Available information indicates overwhelming acceptance of rape
trauma syndrome as a valid description of common reactions to an
extreme trauma such as that caused by rape. Proper use of the proce-
dural tools of our judicial system could minimize the danger of unfair
prejudice to the defendant. Where behavior of a rape victim could
lead a jury to infer consent to sexual intercourse, the court should
allow expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome to aid the jury in
evaluating reactions to an event that is beyond our common
experience.
In other contexts, the Washington Supreme Court has demon-
strated its sensitivity to a "long and unfortunate history of sex discrim-
ination."'13 Assumptions about "normal" reactions to rape are-part of
this history. The court's blanket exclusion of expert testimony on rape
129. See Allewalt, 517 A.2d at 751. Although the Black court found the distinction merely a
semantic one, State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 349, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987), credibility requires
that the medically accepted term be used.
130. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (1977) (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)) (until the effects of such discrimination are eradicated,
care must be taken to assure that self-defense instructions afford women the right to have their
conduct judged in light of the physical handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination).
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trauma syndrome ensures that remnants of this discrimination against
women will continue to survive in Washington courts.
Deborah A. Dwyer
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